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This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food 
processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. 
All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work 
qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand 
specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for 
domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and 
supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly 
specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, 
unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter 
empirical paradox arises mainly because the explanatory variables tend to be extremely 
large for industries with low import ratios and/or low estimated elasticities or slopes 
resulting from relatively volatile import prices. The results with derived import 
parameters point to a much stronger role of campaign contributions within the PFS model 
than previously found. They also suggest that the commonly-used Armington estimates 
may not be appropriate for estimating the PFS model.  
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The most influential of the last wave of the political economy of trade protection 
models is the “Protection for Sale” (PFS) model developed by Grossman and Helpman 
(1994, henceforth GH). Several studies have confirmed its qualitative predictions (e.g., 
Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Eicher and Osang, 
2002; Matschke and Sherlund, 2004), but all have obtained unrealistically large estimates 
of the weight the government places on general welfare vs. the weight on campaign 
contributions, leading to the conclusion that protection is not for sale.
1 These large 
general welfare weight estimates also create a cognitive dissonance between the typical 
levels of campaign contributions by industries and the much larger magnitude of trade 
policy benefits they receive, questioning the truthful contribution assumption maintained 
in the PFS model (Lopez, 2001). 
This article applies the PFS model to a sample of U.S. food processing industries. 
These industries provide a good case study to analyze trade protection. First, trade 
protection varies substantially across industries, from those receiving little or no 
protection (e.g., roasted coffee and macaroni and spaghetti) to those with nominal 
protection coefficients exceeding 50% (e.g., cane sugar, dairy products, and frozen 
specialties). Second, import penetration ratios range from less than 2% for milk to over 
40% for wine and spirits. Third, these industries show wide variation in political 
participation and organization, as reflected by their campaign contributions. Fourth, they 
constitute the largest manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy in terms of value of 
shipments.
2    2
Focusing on food processing industries allows us to look more closely at the 
determinants of trade protection. First, all previous empirical studies of the PFS model 
take estimates of import demand elasticities from outside sources (for the U.S., the 
commonly used source is the study by Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986), which 
provides elasticity estimates at the 3-digit SIC level). In contrast, we derive 4-digit SIC 
import demand elasticity and slope estimates directly from the data used in our sample.
3 
Second, all previous PFS studies either abstract from the existence of intermediate goods 
(e.g. Goldberg and Maggi, 1999) or assume just one intermediate good that is freely 
traded and used by all industries within the sample (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 
2000). In contrast, we explicitly model the fact that food processing industries buy 
products from each other and as buyers may actually lobby for lower trade protection for 
input-providing industries. Third, we use tariff rates and tariff equivalents to measure 
trade protection, whereas the previous literature exclusively uses NTB coverage ratios for 
the United States. The PFS model, however, does not provide any predictions for NTB 
coverage ratios. 
  The empirical results show that the estimated weights are quite sensitive to the 
precise import demand specification and that the weights are much smaller (between 2.6 
and 3.6) when they are derived from estimated domestic demand and supply. Using 
import slopes or elasticities based on direct import demand specifications (including the 
Armington (1969) model) yields the usual high weights placed on domestic welfare 
found in the previous literature, reinforcing the conclusion that protection is not for sale. 
The latter result stems in part from observations for industries with low import 
penetration ratios and possibly low values for import elasticities and/or slopes due to a   3
much larger variation in import prices than domestic ones. Thus, the results with derived 
import demand slopes or elasticities indicate that the role of campaign contributions 
within the PFS may be much stronger than previously found.
 
The Protection for Sale Model 
  In the PFS model (summarized here for exposition purposes), the government 
values both the total level of political contributions and the aggregate well-being of the 
population so that the equilibrium tariff vector maximizes governmental welfare:  
∑ ∈ + j L j
G C aW ,       ( 1 )  
where a  is the weight given to general welfare 
G W , L denotes the set of politically 
organized sectors, and  j C  is contributions by sector j. Letting 
k W  denote the welfare of a 
specific sector k, the sum of governmental welfare and welfare of lobby k is given by:  
∑ ≠ ∈ + + j k j L j
k G C W aW , ,   (2) 
for all  L k ∈ .  The first-order condition w.r.t. the specific tariff  i t  for maximization of 
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The first-order condition w.r.t.  i t  for maximization of governmental welfare and welfare 
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  GH show that under global truthfulness, a lobby compensates the government for 
the domestic welfare loss that arises from its lobbying, i.e. the government is as well off 
as if the lobby did not exist.  
In the following, we assume that industries lobby for trade policy to increase their 
profits, but that lobbies only represent a small fraction of the population and as such do 
not take into account the effects of trade protection on consumer surplus from 
consumption of final goods and on tariff revenue. This is not to say, however, that the 
lobby of industry i only cares about the tariff  i t  on its own good. Lobby i is also 
concerned about the prices of its inputs and will lobby for negative protection for its input 
goods.
  Therefore, we have 

























i X  denotes the input of good i in industry k  and k ≠i. 
 
  Summing equation (4) over all lobbies, we obtain 
 






















ma ,   (8) 
where m  denotes the number of lobbies. Substituting from (3), we obtain  
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where   5
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where  i D  stands for the entire consumption of good i.  The equilibrium specific tariff is 
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= = τ    (12) 
where  i I  is the indicator variable for lobbying by industry i, 
a
i t  denotes ad-valorem 
tariff rates,  i e  is the absolute value of the price elasticity of imports,  i p  is the domestic 
price, and other notation is as defined before. Taking buyer lobbying into account will 
increase the estimate of 
a
1
 and decrease the estimate of a.
 
From (12), the GH model yields three behavioral predictions to be tested:
4  (1) 
industries that are not politically organized face lower rates of protection than those that 
are organized; (2) industries that face organized opposition from buyers are granted lower 
levels of protection; and (3) for protected industries with a constant share of shipments 
that go to organized buyers, the level of protection is inversely related to the price 
elasticity of imports and to import penetration. 
Empirical Implementation 
  Equations (11) and (12) provide the conceptual basis for the empirical models to 
be estimated. The data set to be used contains a number of industries over a number of   6
years. Thus, denote industries by the subscript i and years by the subscript t (not to be 
confused with the specific tariff notation).  
  We estimate import slopes and elasticities for our data set for all industries in the 
sample, taking advantage of the time variation in prices and imports.  Since import slopes 
'
i M  (and price elasticities of imports for that matter) have to be estimated, it is instructive 
to follow Goldberg and Maggi’s approach to deal with errors in estimates and pass the 
import slope to the left-hand side so that the estimating equation becomes  





it Z M t T ε β + = =      ( 1 3 )  
where 
' ˆ
i M  is an estimate of the import slope expressed in absolute value,  a / 1 = β , 
j
it jt j it it
M
it X I Q I Z ∑ − = , where j  superscripts indicate the political organization and 
quantity purchases of industry j, and 
M
it ε  is an error term. Likewise, (12) can be rewritten 
as 











it M Z Z / = . 
  To operationalize (13) and (14), annual time series data (1978-92) from 24 food 
processing industries at the 4-digit 1972 SIC level are used, resulting in 360 
observations.
5  The domestic input and output values as well as corresponding price 
indices are taken from the NBER database on manufacturing productivity by Bartelsman 
and Gray (1996).  Output and input quantity indices were obtained by dividing the value 
of shipments and input expenditures by their respective price indices. The amount of 
output bought by other food processors was obtained from the 1977, 1982, 1987 and   7
1992 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts of the United States (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, various years).
6  
  The values of imports at the 4-digit SIC level were taken from Feenstra (1996). 
Average tariff rates were computed by dividing total duties collected by CIF import 
values from a tape supplied by the US International Trade Commission (1978-90) and its 
website (dataweb.usitc.gov) for 1991-92. Tariff-rate equivalents were used for four 
industries protected by import quotas: sugar (SIC 2061), meat packing (SIC 2011), 
cheese (SIC 2021), and milk (SIC 2026). The tariff-rate equivalents were taken from two 
reports of the U.S. International Trade Commission (1990a, 1990b) and a U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (1994) report.
7 
Data on import prices at the 4-digit SIC level are not readily available.  However, the 
FAO website and Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States (USDA, various years) 
databases provided data on quantity and price for most processed agricultural products.  
Import price indices were constructed by aggregating products by SIC definitions and by 
weighting available quantity and price values.
8   
  Two sets of estimates for import slopes 
'
i M  are obtained: derived slopes from 
domestic linear supply and demand functions and direct slopes from a linear import 
demand equation. To obtain derived slopes, a simultaneous equation system of linear 
domestic demand and supply functions is estimated for each industry via three-stage least 
squares. The derived slope is obtained as  i i i M γ α ˆ ˆ ˆ ' − = , where  i α ˆ  is the estimated 
domestic demand slope and  i γˆ  is the estimated domestic supply slope. To obtain direct 
import slopes, a linear import demand function was estimated via two-stage least squares. 
Apart from domestic price (for the import demand derived from the demand-supply   8
system) and import price (for direct import demand), the regressors included the domestic 
output price index, price of raw materials, wage rates, total factor productivity growth, 
aggregate consumer expenditures, and time index. All nominal prices and consumer 
expenditures were deflated by the consumer price index. Both sets of import slopes are 
reported in Table 2. 
  Three sets of estimates for elasticities  i e  are obtained: derived and direct as well 
as Armington elasticities. As in the case of import slopes, the derived elasticities are 
estimated using the same set of explanatory variables but applied to a double-log 
functional form. To keep the import demand elasticities constant over time in the supply-
demand framework, supply and demand elasticities are weighted by the industry-specific 
mean ratios of supply to imports and demand to imports, respectively.
9 The direct 
elasticities are estimated from a double-log import demand function via two-stage least 
squares and the same set of explanatory variables. All three elasticity estimates are 
presented in Table 2.  
  The Armington estimates are within the range of previous estimates for food 
manufacturing at the 4-digit SIC level, with an average (absolute) value of 1.265. Lopez 
and Pagoulatos (2002) estimated an average elasticity of 1.59 for 40 food industries while 
Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera (2003) obtained an average of 0.931 for 35 food 
industries and Reinert and Clinton (1991) obtained an average elasticity of 0.582 for 17 
food industries. The average direct import demand elasticity is at 1.458, somewhat higher 
than average for the Armington elasticities but still within the range of previous estimates 
at the 4-digit SIC level.    9
  To correct for endogeneity, we employ a two-stage least squares procedure: In the 
first stage, we regress outputs and imports, respectively, on the exogeneous variables of 
the domestic market model used to compute import slopes. Thus, our instruments include 
the price of raw materials, wage rates, total factor productivity growth, aggregate 
consumer expenditures, and a time index. These instruments are deemed satisfactory for 
further analysis based on the high correlation between observed and predicted values of 
outputs and imports.
10 In the second stage, we then replace home-bound industry outputs 
and imports by their fitted values.
 
Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999), political action committee (PAC) 
campaign contributions to congressional candidates were used to construct the political 
organization variable  it I . PAC contributions were first assigned to 4-digit SIC codes for 
each industry between 1978 and 1992.
 The PAC data came from bi-annual reports of the 
Federal Election Commission encompassing the congressional election cycles. 
Contributions were then deflated by the producer price index (1992 = 1). Estimation 
proceeded in three steps.  First, increments of thresholds of PAC contributions (from 
$5,000 to $200,000 in $5,000 increments) were used to define  it I . Second, a logit model 
was estimated and those observations with predicted values greater than 0.5 were taken to 
correspond to organized sectors ( 1 = it I ; 0 otherwise).
11 Third, a preliminary version of 
the PFS model was estimated based on steps 1 and 2 and the t-values and stability of 
results compared. Robust results were obtained at a threshold PAC contribution of 
$10,000. 
  To assess the implications of using various import demand approaches, five 
alternative models are estimated and presented: two based on equation (13) with   10
alternative import slopes and three based on (14) with alternative import elasticity 
estimates. At this juncture, it should be noted that the error terms in (13) and (14) are 
heteroskedastic. Thus, the equations are estimated using two-stage least squares with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
12  
  Data pooling tests were performed three ways: time pooling, industry pooling, 
and complete pooling. A Chow test of these effects failed to reject time pooling but not 
industry pooling at the 5% level for all five versions of the PFS model.
13  Given these test 
results and since we are interested in the structure of protection rather than individual 
time and industry effects, only the main results with complete pooling are presented.
14 
Empirical Results 
  Table 3 presents alternative estimates for the PFS models. The β  coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 99% level across all models.  The results provide further 
support for the fundamental predictions of the GH model. Organized sectors receive more 
protection than unorganized ones, and for organized sectors, protection decreases with 
import penetration or the price elasticity of import demand. In addition, industries that 
sell less output to organized buyers receive more protection. 
  Conceptually, the empirical estimates of equation (14) should yield the same 
estimate for β  using any of the three elasticity estimates and the same relative welfare 
weight on general welfare as equation (13) using either set of import slope estimates. 
Empirically, this is not the case. Although all import demand estimates are based on the 
same data, it is of interest to compare the results, as done below.  
  While understandably the estimated domestic welfare weights are quite sensitive 
to import demand specification, ranging from approximately 2.6 to 3,360, some patterns   11
are clear.  First, the results based on directly specified import demand elasticities yield 
the usual, unrealistically high weights on domestic welfare found in previous studies, 
suggesting that protection is not for sale. Second, the results based on derived import 
slopes or elasticities (estimated at 2.6 and 3.6, respectively) are close to each other and 
yield much lower weights than the results based on directly specified import demands. 
Third, the Armington model elasticities, the most widely used in previous work, yield the 
smallest weights on domestic welfare, although within range of the weights estimated in 
previous work. Fourth, based on derived import demand parameter estimates, the role of 
campaign contributions within the PFS model is much stronger than previously found. 
The parameter estimate for the PFS model (14) with derived import demand 
elasticities implies a general welfare weight of approximately 2.6. This estimate is the 
lowest found to date via econometric estimations. In fact, it is nearly 674 times smaller 
than the weight obtained with direct import elasticities and 1,282 times smaller than the 
one using Armington elasticities.   
The parameter estimate for the PFS model (13) with derived import slopes implies 
a general welfare weight of approximately 3.6. This parameter is 84 times smaller than 
the one obtained with linear import slopes using the same explanatory variables, except 
for the use of import prices instead of domestic prices used in the derived model. In spite 
of this, the direct import slope model yields weight estimates that are much lower than 
those using price elasticities of imports. Yet, the parameter estimates using the direct 
import slopes appear to be large as they indicate that the government values domestic 
welfare 303 times more than campaign contributions, making the latter rather irrelevant 
in influencing trade policy.   12
  From the parameter estimates based on either direct import slopes or elasticities, 
the relative weights on general welfare are unrealistically large. These results indicate 
that protection is unequivocally not for sale as the weights range between 303 for direct 
import slopes, to 3,360 for Armington elasticities.  Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) 
found the relative welfare weight to be approximately 3,175, which is in between our 
elasticity-based estimates. Goldberg and Maggi (1999), Gawande and Li (2004), Eicher 
and Osang (2002), Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2002), and McCalman (2004) 
estimate it between 24 and 125, which are between the estimates using derived and direct 
import demand parameters.   
  Why are the derived slope or elasticity models yielding much smaller estimates 
for domestic welfare than the import demand models specified directly? In theory, 
domestic excess demand should be equivalent to imports at various post-tariff prices. In 
practice, given that we are using apparent consumption to measure domestic 
consumption, imports and excess demand are indeed equivalent but post-tariff and 
domestic prices are not. Domestic prices, import prices, and tariffs all come from 
different sources. 
  Note that, as shown in Table 1, domestic prices are much more stable than import 
prices, which is not only one of the objectives of domestic food and agricultural policies 
in some of the subsectors included (i.e., sugar and dairy industries) but also implies 
partial passthrough. While the average coefficient of variation for post-tariff prices in the 
industries analyzed is approximately 0.50, the one for domestic prices is approximately 
0.20. In other words, the spread of import prices is 250% larger than the one for domestic 
prices as measured by their coefficient of variation. Furthermore, the correlation   13
coefficient of domestic and import prices was 0.40, attesting that there is no perfect price 
transmission from world to domestic markets in processed food markets.  
  Estimating direct elasticities based on domestic rather than import prices leads to 
a domestic welfare weight of 71 instead of 1,766. By virtue of incorporating more 
information, derived estimates provide perhaps a more realistic measure of the potential 
rather than the actual tariff response free of noise incorporated in direct import models, 
particularly the Armington model which in addition assumes imperfect substitution 
between home and foreign food products. Finally, partial price transmission might be due 
to a myriad of factors not accounted for in the PFS model which may partially isolate 
domestic prices, such as government intervention other than import tariffs and quotas, 
market power, contracts, and uncertainty, among other factors. 
  Why are the elasticity-based empirical models for equation (14) yielding such 
large general welfare weights relative to the slope-based models?  Part of the answer may 
lie on the disproportional scale of the regressors used in the PFS model. To illustrate, take 
equation (12) and, for simplicity, ignore buyers’ lobbying. Then the level of protection is 
proportional to the inverse of import penetration and the inverse of the price elasticity of 
imports. Thus, if import penetration ratios and/or import elasticities are quite small, the 
regressors in the PFS model based on import elasticities (the one usually estimated) will 
be quite large. If this is generally the case in the sample, then the general welfare weights 
will tend to be quite large.  
  In our sample, the average import penetration ratio was less than 7% and import 
elasticities average somewhat over 1 (in absolute value) and are often a fraction of that, 
thus magnifying the proportionality problem. As seen from Table 1, the average adjusted   14
regressor for equation (13), using import slopes,  is approximately two times and 22 times 
larger than the average adjusted dependent variables (
M
it T ) for derived and direct 
estimation methods, respectively. In contrast, the average adjusted regressor for equation 
(14), using elasticities, are 551 and 111 times larger than the adjusted dependent variables 
(
e
it T ) using the direct and Armington import demand models. 
  Even though the estimated elasticities are consistent with those obtained in 
previous empirical work, one should keep in mind that previous estimates are viewed as 
too small by many trade economists (McDaniel and Balistreri, 2002). Although 
understandably empirical estimates are sensitive to estimation technique and 
misspecification (e.g., the perfectly competitive assumption), the divergence in direct or 
Armington estimates does not appear enough to produce welfare weights in the same 
range as the derived slope estimates. For instance, Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera 
(2003) find that long-run Armington elasticities are about twice as large as short run 
ones—hardly a magnitude to overcome the proportionality problem.  
The null hypothesis that the government only cares about aggregate welfare 
(H0: = β 0) was rejected at the 1% level by all models.  Alternative hypotheses including 
that the government cares equally about campaign contributions and general welfare (H0: 
β  = 1) and that the government only cares about campaign contributions 
(H0: = β 10,000, using an arbitrarily large number) were also rejected at the 1% level for 
all model specifications. Judging from the magnitude of the welfare weights, the 
government mostly cares about general welfare in setting trade protection. Judging from 
the hypothesis tests, the government is sensitive to both aggregate welfare and campaign 
contributions, although obviously more so to aggregate welfare.
15   15
Summary and Conclusions 
This article applies the Protection for Sale model to the U.S. food processing 
industries using more direct measures of tariff rates and tariff equivalents and more 
disaggregated data than previous work, as well as alternative empirical specifications 
including the PFS model based on import demand slopes and the standard elasticity 
specification based on Armington and direct import demand  models.  
The empirical results strongly support the qualitative predictions of the Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) model with regard to the structure of trade protection. Organized sectors 
are granted protection and the degree of protection inversely depends on import 
penetration and the price elasticity of import demand. In addition, industries facing 
politically organized buyers are granted lower tariffs. 
A surprising result is that the estimated general welfare weight is much lower than 
that found in previous studies when the PFS model is estimated with import slopes or 
elasticities derived from domestic supply and demand. This weight is found to be 
between 2.6 and 3.6 times the weight the government attaches to campaign contributions. 
However, in spite of stark differences in data set and empirical procedures, the welfare 
weights estimated using import slopes or elasticities based on imports--from either the 
Armington model or  directly specified import demand models--are strikingly similar and 
of the same large magnitude as those of previous empirical work, implying that 
protection is not for sale, as the general welfare weights range between 303 and 3,606.  
The results using the direct import elasticity (including Armington’s) or slope  
specifications of the PFS model beg the question raised by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 
(2000) as to why empirically the GH model yields such high weights on domestic welfare   16
vs. campaign contributions. Our analysis suggests that the main culprit is the relatively 
low magnitude of the import price elasticities that result in abnormally large regressors in 
the PFS model. Although low import price elaticities might result from volatile import 
prices vs. domestic prices, the problem of dimensionality of regressors is exacerbated in 
the presence of low import penetration ratios that characterize most industries in our 
sample. This dimensionality problem can be circumvented by estimating the PFS model 
using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply using 
domestic prices. Whether the results of this study can be extended to industries beyond 
those in our sample is a question that awaits further empirical analysis. 
   17
Footnotes 
 1  See Gawande and Krishna (2003) for a review of empirical work using the PFS 
model and other approaches. It should also be noted that there have been attempts to 
explain the very large weights on general welfare.  For example, Gawande and Li (2004) 
introduce uncertainty and a low probability of obtaining the desired protection level to 
create lower welfare weights.  As in previous attempts, however, those low welfare 
weights are the result of simulations and assumptions rather than econometric analysis. 
Protection for Sale has also been tested in countries other than the United States (Turkey 
by Mitra, Thomakos, and Ulubasoglu, 2002; Australia by McCalman, 2004). These 
studies similarly find very high weights on general welfare. 
 
2 The food processing industries accounted for 14% of total U.S. manufacturing 
value of shipments, involving 26,000 establishments and 1.5 million workers in 1992 
(Connor and Schiek, 1997).  
3 Typically, the PFS model for the U.S. is tested for manufacturing industries at 
the 3-digit SIC level (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi, 1999; Eicher and Osang, 2002). In 
contrast, this article tests the PFS model using data from the U.S. food processing 
industries (industries in the SIC 20 classification) at the 4-digit SIC level.  
 4  Equation (12) is a slight modification of the original PFS model since it does not 
contain the percentage of the population that is organized in lobbies.  This modification 
allows us to focus on the welfare weight attached to general welfare, while at the same 
time including the influence of buyer industry lobbies that may oppose trade protection 
for a particular industry.   18
 
5Due to data availability constraints, the 1972 (instead of the 1987) SIC 
definitions were used.  Data translation tables were used for the cases where only the 
1987 SIC or USITC data were available.  Although it would have been desirable to 
extend the analysis to more recent years, missing data on import values and especially on 
import prices made it impossible to include years after 1992.  
 
6We used input-output tables from 1977, 1982, 1987 and 1992. The input values 
were then linearly interpolated for years in between for which no input-output tables are 
published. 
7We are grateful to Frederick Nelson of USDA's Economic Research Service for 
providing updated data on tariff-rate equivalents of import quotas. 
8We are grateful to professors Elena Lopez and Emilio Pagoulatos for furnishing 
their import price indices for the 1972-87 period.  These price indices were extrapolated 
adopting their methodology (Lopez and Pagoulatos, 2002). 
9As imports are assumed to be perfect substitutes for domestic products, import 
elasticities can be calculated from domestic supply and demand elasticities, given that 








it it W W e η η − = , where 
k
it η  are the domestic price elasticities.  The 
weights ) / ( it it
d
it M D W =  and  ) / ( it it
s
it M Q W =  are set to their averages for each industry 
in order to make the import elasticities constant over time for comparison to the other 
import demand elasticity estimates which are also constant over time for each industry. It 
should be noted that making the weights variable by simply using instrumental variables 
for demand, supply, and imports leads to very similar results (β=0.326 vs. 0.382). 
10For instance, the average R
2  for the home-bound domestic production, 
calculated from the squared correlation between the predicted and the observed values,   19
was 87%, ranging from 48 to 99% with a median of 90%. For imports, the average R
2 
was 84%, ranging from 44 to 99% also with a median of 90%.  
11In comparison, Goldberg and Maggi (1999) used any positive values of 
predicted  i I  to define industries with organized sectors, using a standard (non-discrete 
choice) equation model. To endogenize this variable, an additional equation was 
specified, based on the work of Mitra (1999), Grier et al. (1991) and others. Explanatory 
variables include the Herfindahl index to denote industrial concentration, deflated sales to 
denote the size of the industry, and capital intensity (the ratio of fixed capital assets to 
sales). 
 
12 If the import slope or the elasticity estimate error is the only source of error in 
the equation, then one ends up with heteroskedasticity dependent only on the level of 
protection using (13) or (14). However, this is highly unlikely since we are using 
instruments for home-bound production and imports. In addition, if one assumes other 
sources of unknown errors to equations (11) and (12), which is highly likely, then 
heteroskedasticity might also depend on other unspecified factors. Therefore, we opted to 
use White’s (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix to correct for an 
unknown form of heteroskedasticity. 
 
13 Given the low percentage of zero tariff observations, the Tobit results produced 
parameter estimates quite close to those presented here.  On a related point, Maddala 
(1988) advocates the use of the Tobit model when the sample is censored or truncated. In 
our case, zero observations correspond to actual government decisions and are, therefore, 
non-censored and non-truncated. Moreover, we did not find any evidence of import 
subsidies, which would correspond to negative tariff rates.   20
 
14 For the industry effects, two industries (SIC 2032=canned specialties and SIC 
2082=malt liquors) made the results collapse due to lack of variation of the dependent 
and independent variables. Thus, the observations for those industries were eliminated in 
the pooling tests, although their inclusion in the time effect tests did not affect the results. 
All F-statistics are insignificant at the 5% level for the time effects but significant for the 
industry effects. For instance, the individual β coefficients ranged between 0.0004 and 
5.02 for the derived slope model.  
 15 As observed by Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000), high values of a, such 
as the ones found in this study, imply that the relative weight placed on net aggregate 
welfare versus the weight placed on campaign contributions is close. If we denote W as 
gross aggregate welfare and W-C  as net aggregate welfare, then rewrite 
aW C + =) . ( ) 1 ( C W a C a − + +  As a goes to infinity, the weight on net welfare converges 
to the weight on campaign contributions.   21
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics for Key Variables Used. 
 
      S t d .  
Variable Notation  Mean  Dev.  Min.  Max. 
 
Specific Tariff  it t  0.215  0.425  0.00  2.412 
Tariff (% of Dom. Price)  it τ  0.124  0.187  0.00  0.746 
Organization Dummies  it I  0.731  0.444  0.00  1.000 
Home-Bound Prod.  it Q ˆ  5943.3 7571.0  126.81  38399 
Org. Buyers Purchases  ∑
j
it jt X I  698.80  1492.8  0.00  8270.9 
Import Quantities  it M ˆ  338.43 470.78 0.809  2258.7 
Import Prices 
M
it p  1.073 0.459  0.242  3.6997 
Post Tariff Import Prices 
M
it p + it t  1.288  0.658  0.266  4.072 
Domestic Price  it p  1.328 0.265  0.814  2.172 
Derived Elasticities (a. v.)  der i e , ˆ  654.2 2441.3  0.295  29829 
Direct Elasticities (a. v.)  dir i e , ˆ  1.458  1.204  0.230  4.696 
Armington Elast. (a. v..)    arm i e , ˆ  1.265  1.114 0.190  5.102 
Derived Import Slopes (a. v.) 
'
, ˆ
der i M  10090  13882  212.57  45554 
Direct Import Slopes (a.v.) 
'
, ˆ
dir i M  556.2  1043.5 0.204  3945.8 
Adj. Tariff (derived) 
e
der it T ,  193.4 1121.0  0.00  13090 
Adj. Tariff (direct) 
e
dir it T ,  0.181  0.373  0.00  2.577 
Adj. Specific Tariff (derived) 
M
der it T ,  2249.2  8606.3  0.00  70074 
Adj, Specific Tariff (direct) 
M
dir it T ,  143.11  682.5  0.00  5413.5 
Adj. Tariff (Armington) 
e
arm it T ,  0.899  0.118  0.00  0.564 
Adj. Regressor (eq. 13) 
M
it Z  4384.2 6515.7  -497.72  31764 
Adj. Regressor (eq. 14) 
e
it Z  99.89  220.98  -85.501  1302.6 
 
Note:  The subscripts ‘arm’,‘dir’ and ‘der’are used to distinguish estimates based on the Armington, direct 
import demand models, and derived estimates based on domestic demand and supply, respectively. The term 
‘a.v.’ stands for absolute value. Note that import slopes and elasticities are constant over time for each industry.   25
Table 2: Alternative Import Demand Estimates 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 --------------Elasticities------------- ------Slopes---------- 
   Derived  Direct  Armington Derived  Direct 
SIC Industry  der i e , ˆ   dir i e , ˆ   arm i e , ˆ   der i M ,
' ˆ   dir i M ,
' ˆ   
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
2011 Meat Packing Plants  -14.798  -1.554  -0.923  -43010.4  -3618.9 
2013 Sausage & Prepared Meats  -5.845  -0.960  -0.733  -19681.7  -845.6 
2016 Poultry Dressing Plants  -1000.8  -0.230  -0.829  -45554.2  -15.97 
2017 Poultry & Egg Processing  -625.0  -2.715  -1.066  -8521.4  -11.44 
2021 Creamery Butter  -1622.8  -1.679  -0.865  -4553.7  -0.20 
2022 Cheese, Natural & Processed  -84.277  -0.595  -0.500  -40806.4  -107.36 
2023 Condensed & Evaporated Milk  -1.359  -0.838  -0.887  -976.2  -307.01 
2026  Fluid  Milk  -153.48 -1.050  -0.479 -5534.1 -26.85 
2032 Canned Specialties  -268.94  -2.482  -0.752  -9001.4  -81.34 
2033 Canned Fruits & Vegetables  -14.361  -0.832 -1.262 -14927.5 -696.72 
2034 Dried/Deh. Fruit & Veg.  -15.262 -0.305  -0.802 -1575.5 -14.24 
2035 Pickled Sauces & Salad Dress.  -41.739  0.547  -2.973 -3383.5 -51.49 
2046 Wet Corn Milling  -73.183  -3.403  -3.405  -3560.8  -358.85 
2051 Bread & Bakery Products  -256.358  -4.696  -5.102  -23967.0  -143.47 
2061 Raw Cane Sugar  -1.559  -1.384  -0.189  -212.5  -88.61 
2062 Refined Sugar  -0.867  -4.066  -0.408  -825.7  -3945.8 
2065 Candy & Confectionary Prod.  -8.741  -2.433  -0.882  -3947.1  -634.30 
2067 Chewing Gum  -59.628  -0.760  -0.194  -767.9  -12.29 
2074 Cottonseed Oil Mills  -139.232  -1.190  -1.612  -1186.3  -43.71 
2076 Vegetable Oil Mills  -11.476  -0.351  -1.050  -1165.4  -1.62 
2082 Malt Liquors  -0.924  -0.602  -1.519  -3522.2  -1563.04 
2091 Canned & Cured Seafood  -9.267  -1.251  -1.096  -3802.9  -703.04 
2095 Roasted Coffee Processors  -3.193  -0.282  -0.581  -1055.0  -57.61 
2098 Macaroni & Spaghetti  -19.822  -0.803  -2.248  -622.0  -17.89 
 




Note: The import slopes were derived from a supply and demand model while the import price elasticities were 
derived from double log specifications so that all the parameters are constant over time for each industry. Note 
that the slopes and elasticities in this table are expressed in actual instead of absolute values.   26
 
 
Table 3.  Results From Alternative Empirical Specifications of the PFS Model, U.S. Food Manufacturing 
Industries, 1972-92. 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Import Elasticities    Import Slopes 
 Variable  Parameter  Derived  Direct  Armington Derived  Direct 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   
e
der it T ,  
e
dir it T ,  
e
arm it T ,  
M
der it T ,  
M





it Z   β   0.382 0.00057 0.00030   




it Z   β          0.277    0.0033 




Relative Weight on  a  2.621 1,766  3,360  3.606  303 










Note:  Number of observations = 360.  Industries are defined at the 1972 4-digit SIC levels.   
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